Wenn Sie einen Freischaltcode erhalten haben, geben Sie ihn bitte hier ein:. Login de en. Erweiterte Suche. Bildung und Kultur. Medienwissenschaft, Kommunikationsforschung. Soziale Arbeit. Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft. Chapter 1: Introduction Seite 23— Chapter 2: Designing local government for development and accommodation of diversity Seite 31— Chapter 3: Local administration, development, and ethnicity in Ethiopia: Historical perspective Seite 85— Chapter 5: Decentralisation and development in Ethiopia: Local autonomy Seite — Chapter 6: Decentralisation and development in Ethiopia: Central supervision and inter-governmental co-operation Seite — Chapter 7: Decentralisation and accommodation of intra-regional ethnic minorities in Ethiopia Seite — Chapter 8: Conclusion Seite — Bibliography Seite — Local government in Ethiopia Bibliography.
Such is the case of Germany Manow, and Austria Obinger, The process of nation-state formation in Brazil concentrated decision-making power in the central government, in addition to regulatory and spending power. In democratic periods, solidly instituted normative orientations tended to give higher priority to homogenous national policies than to regional demands for autonomy. Inequality among jurisdictions to perform governing functions gave rise to the centralization of the authority on taxing, planning, and even on policy implementation.
Similarly, authoritarian regimes ; , and suppressed the autonomy of subnational units for extended periods. In effect, the centralization of the Union occurred at the end of the First Republic Elites feared what would befall the nation given the incapacity of the provinces and peripheries to undertake governing functions in the social Hochman, and economic realms Oliveira, ; Schwartzman, 4.
Beginning in the s, the central government assumed a central role in the planning and financing of economic activity, which presupposed the centralization of political authority Draibe, ; Nunes, ; Sikkink, ; Souza, The centralization of tax collection permitted the Brazilian developmentalist state to allocate considerable revenues to the goal of diminishing regional inequalities.
This economic imperative was accompanied by federal initiatives to supervise federal policies at the subnational level Arretche, The federal supervision of subnational governments was also justified by the conditions of local politics, namely, the pervasiveness of corruption and clientilism Leal, The authoritarian rulers of the s provided a justification for the authoritarian regime installed in the s. They did so by claiming that the political autonomy of the states represented an instrument by which backwards regional oligarchies manipulated and exploited ignorant electors.
The danger was that these oligarchies were able to impede the initiatives of a modernizing central government Mota, Combating corruption and local-level patronage also figured prominently among the justifications for the suppression of regional autonomy by the military regime that took power in Carvalho, Finally, legislation that regulated the finances of subnational governments beginning in the mid s was justified in the Chamber of Deputies through the claim that policies of great importance could not be left in the hands of local politicians Arretche, , Therefore, far from a Tieboutian vision, the notion that federal supervision of local politics can efficiently protect citizens against backwards, corrupt elites is deeply embedded in Brazilian history.
Currently, this vision is shared among progressive elites, even those who favor decentralization in the implementation of public policies Almeida, However, homogeneous national rules do not necessarily imply equal results. Instead, different factors explain persistent social and regional inequalities in Brazil.
First, economic advances have been concentrated in the South and Southeast regions. As a result, subnational governments' taxable bases vary a lot. In spite of the fact that national redistributive policies do aim at reducing revenue-inequality among jurisdictions, their outcomes are limited by the high levels of inequality on subnational self-generated revenues.
Therefore, rather than fully reducing territorial inequality, redistributive policies have indeed only alleviated it. Social policies in Brazil, by their turn, were modeled according to values inspired by conservative welfare regimes since their very inception in the s Draibe, , Esping-Andersen, Not surprisingly, these policies have fundamentally produced status differences among different categories of citizens. The rights of citizens were unequally attributed in accordance with their position in the workplace. The result is that policies awarded social benefits relative to the worker power in the job market.
In a context of high unemployment and income inequality, these entitlement rules reinforced exclusion and segregation instead of reducing socio-economic inequalities. In response to the challenges of territorial integration, the Brazilian nation-state formation tended toward centralization Almond and Powell, Additionally, unemployment and informality in the workplace - combined with Bismarckian social rights - implied that multitudes remained disenfranchised from social assistance.
Finally, to compensate for this unequal participation in the benefits of the welfare system, the response of the developmentalist state was to substitute social rights for political and civic rights, dividing citizens along corporatist lines Santos, ; Carvalho, Current policies that aim to reduce territorial inequalities are the result of a combination of this centralizing tendency, with fiscal and political reforms approved during the recent period of democracy, from to the present.
The Bismarckian features of policies introduced during the era of President Getulio Vargas and the military regime have found compensation in a trend towards de-commodification: 5 the universalization of health and education, as well as a non-contributive component in the social security system. To the same end, the federal government expanded regulation and supervision over subnational governments beginning in the s. The goal was to prioritize spending on health and education, as well as to ensure fiscal discipline - among other ends.
In short, a solid tradition of federal regulation was once again employed to implement compensatory policies that would address social and geographic inequalities. Brazil's experience shows that - apart from a general identity of belonging to a national community the concept of nationhood - distrust in the willingness of local elites to implement and respect the rights of citizens can serve as powerful source toward centralizing political authority, even in federal states.
Under these circumstances, even progressive elites favorably disposed to the local implementation of public policies prefer that the federal government regulate the way in which these policies are implemented. The idea is to tie the hands of governors and mayors who, it is assumed, are eager to convert federal resources into conservative, corrupt, and clientilistic policies. As previously discussed, an adequate interpretation of decentralization requires a conceptual distinction between responsibility for policy-making and the authority for policy decision-making.
This implies avoiding a frequently employed analytical inference: deducing the latter from empirical evidence about the former. To a large extent, the proposition regarding the autonomy of subnational governments in Brazil is compromised by the conflation of these two concepts. Fleshing-out this analytical distinction allows for a considerably more accurate interpretation of the Brazilian federation and the dynamics of implementing decentralized policies.
Given the historical processes summarized in the previous section, it should be clear that the central government possesses considerable tools to regulate subnational governments. Furthermore, the provision of public services and the allocation of spending are strong influenced by federal legislation and supervision.
The result is that, although constituent units are politically autonomous and have responsibility for tax collection and policy implementation, their decision-making autonomy cannot be adequately interpreted if we ignore how subnational agendas are affected by federal regulation. Therefore, any analysis of the territorial inequalities affecting Brazilian citizens requires an examination of national policies.
Homogenous federal rules govern the tax authority of Brazil's constituent units. Local and state governments are not authorized to freely collect taxes, even if their citizens accept to pay them. Unlike a Tieboutian world, municipal governments are authorized to tax only urban property, services and the transfer of property. They are forbidden to tax any other taxable basis. Therefore, the taxation authority of municipal governments in Brazil is limited to defining their own tax rates. The revenue streams of municipal government do include, however, constitutionally mandated transfers.
The distribution of these transfers is governed by multiple criteria. In practice, this formula has been frozen since Rezende, Constitutionally mandated transfers at the state level operate by the principle of tax rebate. Seventy-five per cent of the amount to be distributed must be calculated according to revenues collected in each jurisdiction.
Finally, a fourth component of municipal revenues comes from universal conditional transfers. These transfers became universal on the early s and are, therefore, a more recent tool employed to reduce revenue-based territorial inequalities. They are also compulsory earmarked to specific policies.
These transfers are earmarked to cover from basic health care to hospitalization.
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They are also universal because virtually percent of Brazil's municipalities opted to follow the rules of the Unified Health System. With regards to education, earmarked transfers are universal because all subnational governments are obliged, by the Federal Constitution, to deposit 20 percent of their own tax revenues and federal transfers in an audited account whose redistribution occurs across each state.
For each state-level fund, revenues are distributed according to the number of slots offered. Figure 1 presents the impact of each revenue source in municipal budgets. Constitutional transfers - from the federal and state governments to municipalities - represent a significant increase in resources for municipal coffers. For their part, universal conditional transfers have had an additional positive impact.
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As illustrated by Figure 1 , the remaining transfers have had minimal budgetary impact. This indicator is mostly irrelevant, because it reveals that the impact of negotiated transfers on municipal revenues is marginal. In short, it tells us little relative to the other indicators that provide data on transfers.
Therefore, it is clear that a significant part of municipal revenues lies outside the realm of political bargaining, because their distribution is mandated constitutionally. Hence, although negotiated transfers possess some relevance for political negotiations between the president and parliamentarians, their ultimate impact on municipal resources is much less relevant than assumed.
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Mayors receive resources from the central government independent of their political affiliation or political behavior. Although additional resources may be welcome, the supply of local public services does not depend on political relations, whether they be partisan or individual.
Most statistical analyses on the impact of constitutional transfers do not distinguish between federal or state transfers. One exception is Biderman , who disaggregated them and demonstrated that federal transfers are progressive whereas state transfers, regressive. In effect, taking central-local relations seriously requires this analytical distinction. As previously observed, the allocation of these transfers is governed by multiple criteria.
Figure 2 disaggregates the different revenue streams of Brazilian municipalities and presents their respective Gini coefficients. Results are calculated for self-generated tax-collection itself and for additional sources of revenue. The indicators therefore measure the impact of each type of transfer on revenue territorial inequality in relation to self-generated tax collection. In this way, if Brazil's municipalities were to count only on the resources derived from their own tax collection, Gini Coefficients suggest that their spending capacity would be highly unequal close to 0.
If Brazil's municipalities were only to count on state-level transfers -- namely, from ICMS and IPVA , in addition to their own self-generated tax revenues, they would be less unequal, since this revenue source reduces the Gini coefficient to approximately 0.
Put differently, the tax collection of municipalities, added to state transfers, in large part reflects the disparities in economic activity across Brazil's municipalities, given that state transfers operate as rebates. Federal transfers reduce a lot self-generated revenue inequality. Their entry into municipal coffers reduces the Gini coefficient by close to 0. That is, if Brazilian municipalities could only count on their own tax revenues and on the revenues of the Municipal Participation Fund, their revenue inequality would be cut by half.
Note that the data presented in Figure 1 indicates that federal transfers are a main components of municipal revenues. The Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Advancement of Teaching and the Unified Health System's 96 Basic Operational Norm were actually implemented in , which explains why universal conditional transfers began in this year. Their redistributive impact have been significant.
If they were the only transfer municipalities had access to, besides municipal self-generated tax collection, their effect on the reduction of revenue inequality would be similar to the Municipal Participation Fund. Beginning in , these policies began to have a more significant impact than all other resources that had previously been marshaled towards reducing revenue inequality among jurisdictions.
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In isolation, these policies are surely the most redistributive, because in the transfers of the Unified Health System and the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Advancement of Teaching reduced the Gini coefficient to 0. However, it is important to note that their global impact on municipal revenues is rather limited refer to Figure 1.
Negotiated transfers had an important effect on reducing revenue inequality, particularly after they were initiated in Contrary to the expectations of public choice theory, these transfers do not appear to reinforce or reproduce inequality derived from the wealth of each jurisdiction - even if their redistributive effect is more limited than the combined impact of the Municipal Participation Fund, the Unified Health System, and the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Advancement of Teaching.
Finally, municipal revenue sources altogether hover around a Gini coefficient of 0. Instead of an outcome associated with tax competition, Brazil's fiscal rules clearly reduce revenue inequality among municipalities. Whichever of the federal transfers we take - the Municipal Participation Fund or the Unified Health System and the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Advancement of Teaching - and the same for negotiated transfers, the data confirms the proposition that the poorest jurisdictions are those that most benefit from the redistributive role of transfers.
Moreover, revenue inequality reduction is not associated with political negotiations to form coalitions in support of presidential legislative initiatives. Instead, distributive mechanisms work in highly predictable ways; after all, they are governed by constitutional and infra-constitutional rules. Rules regimenting the spending of Brazil's subnational governments constitute a central component of federal policies governing decentralization.
These rules limit the decision-making autonomy of constituent units in relation to the allocation of their resources. As previously discussed, these rules do not represent a new component of the federal regulations that govern subnational entities. In effect, "binding" constituent units to desired spending behaviors through constitutional imperatives was a feature of the Constitution, and served to link a small amount of revenues to developmentalist goals.
More recently, the Calmon Amendment and the Constitution of earmarked subnational revenues to education Arretche, Therefore, the novelty of earmarking subnational expenditures, beginning in the mid s, refers to the policy areas that federal regulation is addressed to. At least 40 percent of municipal revenues must be allocated to the areas of health care and education - 25 percent for education 11 and 15 percent for health.
With regards to urban development, such as urban infrastructure, housing, public transport, and sanitation, the influence of federal regulation is much more limited. Although municipal governments receive transfers to implement these policies, they are neither universal nor regular. Furthermore, spending in these areas is not constitutionally determined. In other words, subnational governments enjoy considerable autonomy in implementing these policies. In this study, regulated policies apply to public education and health care, whereas non-regulated policies are urban development housing and urban infrastructure , and public transport.
It is important to note, however, that this analytical distinction is not an attribute of public policy, but rather an attribute of central-local relations that in turn affects the decision-making autonomy of the government level in charge of implementation. As a hypothetical situation, a constitutional mandate that municipalities spend one percent of their revenues on public housing would be considered a regulated policy. Similarly, a federal policy that creates regular and universal transfers for transportation policies in metropolitan centers - and earmarks municipal budgets to this end - would imply federal regulation for relevant municipalities.
It is therefore central regulation that converts a municipal policy into a regulated one. Given the characteristics of Brazilian federalism, the possibility exists to regulate subnational budgets in any area of public policy. The concept of regulation advanced in this study refers to an upper-level government authority to establish the rules policies implemented by subnational governments as well as its authority to supervise them.
As Brazil's municipalities are considered "equal units" as providers of public services, it is possible to examine the effect of federal regulation - its presence or absence - on their spending behavior. Two interconnected effects - however different - can be examined. The first refers to discordance among jurisdictions, and the second to territorial inequality. It can be evaluated by levels of spending. Inequality in spending, in turn, refers to the distance between a hypothetical situation - in which all jurisdictions would have the same spending per capita - and actual levels of per capita spending.
This can be measured by the Gini coefficient. Figure 3 presents a box-plot that illustrates variation in the share of health on total spending for all of Brazil municipalities from to Almost half of Brazil's municipalities are very close to the median, which hovers around 20 percent of total municipal budgets.
However, if we consider all municipalities, we may note that there is a substantial degree of discordance. Including the outliers, one fourth of municipalities spend ten percentage points above the average. The other half spend comparatively little on health; in effect, they tend to spend less than what is mandated by the Constitution. The box-plot in Figure 4 illustrates the same data, but refers to spending on education. For half of Brazil's municipalities, variation in spending priorities in this area hovers around an median value of 25 percent, which indicates that they obey constitutional rules.
The interval in variation for all municipalities falls between 10 and 50 percent of total spending. In this particular policy, we find a behavior similar to that which is encountered in public health spending, although the internal variation is larger. In general, Brazil's municipalities confer high priority to education. Figure 5 presents the same data in housing and urban spending. The results indicate that spending in this area receives low priority in the budgetary decisions of municipalities.
Twenty-five percent of municipalities allocated between zero and five percent of their spending to these policy domains. Note that the variation hovers around a median of approximately ten percent of total spending - a lower outlay than is observed in regulated policies. In sum, the data indicate that housing policies and urban infrastructure receive less priority from municipal governments. Finally, Figure 6 presents the same information on spending for public transport.
This policy clearly receives low priority among all municipalities. It tends to reflect behavior that is considerably homogeneous; that is to say that there is a concentration around the median, below five percent. Twenty five percent of municipalities applied close to zero in this policy, indicating a virtual absence of priority in this area of public spending.
Observe that a group of outliers gave high spending priority to this area. In sum, the spending priorities of Brazil's municipalities illustrate a clear pattern. Regulated policies receive high priority in municipal expenses, whereas non-regulated areas do not. This behavior is not a random result; it can be explained by central-local relationships and by the convergence produced as a result of federal legislation and supervision.
On the other hand, we cannot ignore variation in the priority accorded to different policies, in and of themselves. Despite regulation, there are municipalities that discord with the priorities of others. This brings us to the issue of inequality. Figure 7 presents Gini coefficients on municipal spending in each one of the policies previously examined, 15 from to Spending in public education and culture presents the smallest Gini coefficient - and as early as 0.
The introduction of the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Advancement of Teaching reduced inequality in spending: from 0. Conversely, public health and sanitation evince a Gini coefficient that is considerably higher than what is observed in the case of spending on public education and culture 0.
The implementation of the Ministry of Health's Operational Norms in implied a reduction in the inequality of spending, to 0. The trajectory trended downwards, until the last year of the data series: 0. The coefficients of regulated policies remained basically identical beginning in , when conditional transfers and federal earmarking of subnational revenues were fully incorporated into public health and education policies. This outcome means that central regulatory mechanisms produced similar results on the horizontal spending inequality in health and education.
In effect, both policies are affected by similar regulatory mechanisms: earmarking of subnational revenues and earmarked conditional transfers. The same can be said about non-regulated spending in urban housing, infrastructure, and transport. These areas present higher levels of spending inequality. The Gini coefficient for urban housing and infrastructure was high at the beginning of the data series 0.
In , the Gini coefficient was 0. With regards to public transport, the horizontal inequality of spending also trended upwards, with a 15 percent increase in the Gini coefficient, from 0. In short, there is a clear pattern of spending inequality among Brazil's municipalities.
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In the areas of health and education - regulated policies - the inequality in spending is much reduced, whereas non-regulated policy domains reflect significant disparities in per capita spending. What mechanisms can explain this result? Note that the Gini coefficients of regulated policies have values that approximate municipal revenues. The inequality of spending for regulated policies, therefore, is the result of a combination of the redistributive outcome of federal transfers with central-led regulation on spending - which puts conditions on revenues, earmarking them to selected policies.
The absence of federal regulation therefore implies higher inequality in spending among jurisdictions. It ought to be reiterated that this is not a random result, nor an expression of chaotic behavior. Instead, it can be explained by central regulation employed to "bind" local governments to specific policies.
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It consists of earmarking municipal revenues with spending functions and supervising them by means of Brazil's auditor general Tribunais de Contas. Revenue place-inequality, by its turn, is reduced by the redistributive role performed by federal transfer. In theoretical terms, reducing territorial inequality presupposes that the central government is simultaneously advancing regulatory and redistributive measures. The data presented above indicate that, despite the convergence effect produced by federal regulation, there is considerable variation in how municipal governments accord their spending priorities, even for regulated policies.
It means that the autonomy of local governments over their own policies operates toward variation. In theoretical terms, the possibility of discord, derived from the autonomy of local governments, operates in the sense of territorial inequality. The combination of these two dimensions, that is, the centralization of authority combined with the possibility of discord is a central characteristic of the Brazilian federalism. By contrast, the autonomy of local governments tends towards inequality. Therefore, an adequate interpretation of "the particular nature of Brazilian federalism" must take into account these two dimensions.
In the presence of both that is, in regulated policies , territorial inequality is bounded. In the absence of such regulation, the chances that a policy will assume priority are small; hence, spending inequality will be much larger. The evidence presented in this paper does not confirm the expectation that Brazilian federalism can be aptly described as devoid of coordination.
If our federal institutions produced, in effect, a Tieboutian world in which each jurisdiction advanced a strategy based on competition - derived from full tax and public policy autonomy - the expected result would be a "race to the bottom" in public spending. Each jurisdiction would try to get rid itself of the poor and attracting wealthy taxpayers, both citizens and businesses.
Instead, the results show priority to spending in public health and education, which primarily benefit the poor. The explanatory mechanism for this observed behavior is the regulation and supervision of the central government.